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I
INTRODUCTION
The necessity for increasingly sophisticated evidentiary approaches to
proving class-based employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 has led to increasing reliance on statistics by
plaintiffs and defendants alike. One of the most sophisticated statistical
techniques used to date in employment discrimination law is multiple
regression analysis. The application of multiple regression analysis offers
great and, perhaps, the only potential for addressing certain types of Title VII
claims, particularly wage discrimination claims. Recent court decisions,
however, have made abundantly clear that evidentiary presentations based on
multiple regression will be carefully scrutinized, and that inadequately
prepared statistics will be rejected. In the legal context, multiple regression is
both a Mecca and a minefield.
Defendants have used a variety of strategies to attack evidence of illegal
discrimination presented through plaintiffs' regression studies. Two modes
of attack have been the most frequently successful: the claim that plaintiffs'
regression statistics fail to account for important explanatory factors; and the
claim that plaintiffs' statistics are skewed by the inclusion of data on persons
hired prior to the actionable statutory period of Title VII.
The courts of appeal have taken divergent approaches to evaluating such
attacks, at times discounting plaintiffs' statistics in summary fashion. The
Supreme Court has not yet established a universal standard of review. Two
recent cases in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Trout v.
Lehman 2 and Segar v. Smith,3 have provided a strong theoretical approach to
the review of cases relying on multiple regression analysis consistent with the
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2. 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
3. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
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analytical structure established under Title VII. Most recently, Segar has
proposed that an integrated approach using disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories simultaneously is appropriate for review of complex statistical
cases.
4
This article will begin with a brief review of how multiple regression
analysis works and of the Title VII context in which that analysis must
operate. It will then consider the defendants' typical "missing factor" and
"pre-Act discrimination" attacks on plaintiffs' statistical showing of
discrimination. Finally, the article will explore how plaintiffs can use the
integrated disparate treatment/impact analytical model to counter
defendants' attacks. Additionally, this article suggests that plaintiffs should
introduce the "continuing violation" theory into the multiple regression
arena where pre-Act discrimination is an issue. These two analytical tools will
help plaintiffs to address the full extent of discrimination revealed by multiple
regression studies.
II
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE AND ITS
LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Technique
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique used to indicate how a
number of different factors acting together influence a particular outcome. 5
In the employment discrimination context it is most frequently used to
indicate what factors influence individuals' salaries. 6 The following brief
explanation of how the technique works is intended only to provide sufficient
background to allow the unfamiliar reader to follow the subsequent
discussion of the defendants' attacks against the technique. More complete
explanations of the statistical methodology of multiple regression are
available in the literature. 7 The following example indicates how multiple
regression is usually applied in the employment discrimination context.
4. Id. at 1265-73. See infra section II1; see also cases cited infra notes 126-47 and accompanying
text.
5. For a more thorough treatment of how multiple regression analysis works, see Fisher,
Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Levin & Robbins, Urn Models for
Regression Analysis, with Applications to Employment Discrimination Studies, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1983, at 247; Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof
and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975); Note, Title VII, Multiple Linear Regression Models, and the
Courts: An Analysis, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 283. See generally D. BALDUS &J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION ch. 8 (1980 & Supp. 1983); T. WONNACOTr & R. WONNACOrr,
INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS (4th ed. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1261-63 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985); Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 478-80 (8th Cir. 1984); Trout v. Lehman,
702 F.2d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984); Valentino v. United States
Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Allen v. Prince George's County, 538 F. Supp. 833,
848 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 737 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000
(1986) (per curiam); cases cited infra notes 126-47.
7. See sources cited supra note 5.
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An initial look at one company's personnel system might indicate that
years of education, years of experience, and performance evaluation scores all
influence an individual's salary. Female employees at this company believe
that they are being paid less, given their qualifications, than male employees.
Multiple regression analysis permits an estimation, on the average, of how
much each of the factors-education, experience, and performance evaluation
scores-influences salary. In addition, it permits an examination of whether
sex is a factor in setting salary.
To apply multiple regression analysis, data on the education, experience,
performance evaluations, sex, and salaries of the company's employees are
entered into a computer. A standard statistical program8 will perform the
necessary calculations and provide information in the form of an equation
indicating how much each of the chosen factors influences salary. For
example, the computer printout will give values for the coefficients of the
following standard equation:
S = k + axl + bx 2 + CX3 + dx4 + u.
In this equation, S is monthly salary; k is a constant; a is the coefficient
associated with xl, years of education; b is the coefficient associated with x2,
years of experience; c is the coefficient associated with x3, last performance
evaluation (scale of 1, low, to 6, high); d is the coefficient associated with x4,
sex (1 if male, 0 if female); and u is a random error term representing the
presumably neutral effects of factors left out of our model.
The printout might give the following values:
k = $200,
a = $50 (education),
b = $100 (experience),
c = $75 (performance evaluation),
d = $400 (if male).
Thus, a person with a college degree (sixteen years of education), three years
of experience, a performance evaluation of 4, and who is male, will be paid on
average:
S = $200 + ($50)(16) + ($100)(3) + ($75)(4) + $400,
S = $200 + $800 + $300 + $300 + $400,
S = $2, 000 per month.
A female employee with exactly the same qualifications, according to this
model, would earn only $1,600 per month because a factor of $400 additional
dollars per month is associated with being male.
The computer printout will also provide information indicating the
probability that the results achieved are due to chance, rather than the factor
in question. This information is usually in the form of a t statistic or an F
statistic. The values on the printout can be checked against standard
statistical tables to see whether the results in question are statistically
significant. In the social sciences, results are generally considered statistically
8. For example, the widely available software package, Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS), includes a regression program suitable for these purposes.
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significant if the likelihood that they occurred by chance is no more than one
in twenty, or .05. This corresponds to a ninety-five percent confidence level.
Some results are reported as significant if they could have occurred by chance
only one time in a hundred, or .01. This corresponds to a ninety-nine percent
confidence level. Courts generally have been willing to consider statistics
which are significant at the .05 level as legally significant evidence, in the
absence of flaws in the statistical methodology used.9 Thus, in the above
example, if the $400 factor associated with being male was determined to be
statistically significant, and the statistical methodology was acceptable, it
would raise an inference of sex-based wage discrimination.
Because multiple regression statistics have the technical capacity to
identify discriminatory influences from among the combined effects of a set of
factors acting simultaneously, they have powerful and useful potential in Title
VII litigation. Multiple regression can even indicate the extent to which a
protected group is damaged by a discriminatory practice. Multiple regression
can also reveal discrimination where no direct comparisons are possible
between males and females or blacks and whites because they do not have
precisely the same qualifications.
The probative value of statistical techniques such as multiple regression,
of course, can be no greater than their methodological reliability. In practice,
methodological issues form the crux of a court's problems in deciding how
much weight, if any, to afford to statistical presentations based on multiple
regression analysis. In the past few years, many statistical presentations by
plaintiffs which purported to show statistically significant discrimination have
been rejected by the courts as methodologically flawed.' 0 Defendants'
statistics have also been rejected on methodological grounds.I
As will be discussed in section III, two of the key points of methodological
attack involve the choice of explanatory factors used in the regression analysis
and the proper limitation of data to be used in the analysis. The debate over
these issues does not arise from statistical theory alone, but also from the
application of statistical theory within the relevant limits of Title VII litigation.
B. Burdens of Proof in the Title VII Context
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It specifically covers
hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of
9. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1283 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985);
Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 475 n.13 (8th Cir. 1984).
10. See, e.g., Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 752-54 (2d Cir. 1984); Allen v. Prince George's
County, 737 F.2d 1299, 1305 (4th Cir. 1984); Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56,
68-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC v. International Business Machs. Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875, 897-99 (D.
Md. 1984). But see Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam).
11. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1284-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985); Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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employment.' 3 Litigation under Title VII generally proceeds under one of
two evidentiary theories: the disparate treatment theory or the disparate
impact theory. 14
1. Disparate Treatment. The disparate treatment theory is utilized by
plaintiffs who are attempting to show that members of a protected class have
been treated less favorably by an employer than other similarly situated
individuals. While disparate treatment theory requires the plaintiffs to prove
intentional discrimination, this intent is inferred in practice by circumstantial
evidence of differential treatment.
For a discrimination case brought by an individual under the disparate
treatment theory, the Supreme Court set out the order and burdens of proof
of the parties in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 15 First, the
plaintiff must make out a prima facie case. The particular facts necessary to
make out a prima facie case vary with the circumstances, 16 but the plaintiff
must raise at least an inference of discrimination by eliminating the most
obvious nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action in question.
The burden of going forward with the evidence then shifts to the employer,
which must put forward a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason"'17 for its
actions. The plaintiff may then attempt to show that the employer's
explantion is merely a pretext for discrimination. The burden of proof always
remains with the plaintiff to show discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18
Despite the apparently clear-cut explanation of the order and burdens of
proof supplied by the Supreme Court for individual cases, several appellate
courts have questioned Burdine's application to class-based disparate
treatment claims. To prevail in a class-based claim, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the defendant engaged in an "pattern or practice" of
discrimination not merely by proving isolated incidents of discrimination, but
rather by showing that discrimination was the "defendant's standard
operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice." 19 These
are the types of cases in which multiple regression analysis is typically used.
13. Part of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
14. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.17 (1977).
15. 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
17. Id. at 802.
18. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
19. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
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In pattern or practice cases, several courts have held that not only the
burden of presenting evidence, but the burden of proof shifts to the employer
once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case. As Judge Higgenbotham stated
in his 1981 district court decision in Vyanich v. Republic National Bank, 20 "[i]n a
complex class action, utilizing statistical proof and counterproof, the value of
the Burdine sequence-to highlight the issues in contest-is about as relevant
as a minuet is to a thermonuclear battle."2' The very use of complex
statistical proof in Title VII cases is requiring some changes in the evidentiary
approaches needed to handle it.
Judge Higgenbotham's view has met with accord in the Eleventh Circuit, 22
and has been cited with approval by the Eighth Circuit.23 Some other circuits
have continued to employ the traditional Burdine sequence in both classwide
and individual cases. 24
Where a court transfers the burden of proof to the defendants to combat
the plaintiff's prima facie case, this transfer appears to go hand in hand with
an elevation of the standard of proof required for plaintiff's prima facie case.
As the Eighth Circuit stated in a footnote in Craik v. Minnesota State University
Board, 25
The prima facie case established by a finding that an employer is guilty of a pattern or
practice of discrimination goes far beyond the prima facie case contemplated by
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine . . . . ([Under the Burdine standard] "[t]he burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.") 26
Evidently the Eighth Circuit concludes that the difficult nature of raising
even an inference of discrimination on a classwide basis justifies a higher
rebuttal standard than that appropriate for individual cases of discrimination.
2. Disparate Impact. The second major analytical approach utilized in Title
VII litigation is based on the disparate impact theory. Under disparate
impact, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by identifying a facially
neutral policy used by the employer which has a disproportionately negative
effect on the plaintiff's protected group.27 This disproportionately negative
impact is demonstrated with statistics. The employer may rebut the prima
facie case by demonstrating that the policy producing the disparate impact is
justified by business necessity. 28 This justification cannot stand, however, if
20. 521 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th
Cir. 1984).
21. Id. at 661.
22. See Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 1983).
23. Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 n.7 (8th Cir. 1984).
24. See, e.g., Coser v. Moore, 587 F. Supp. 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir.
1984).
25. 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 471 n.9 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)).
27. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
28. Id. at 431.
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the plaintiff can suggest a less discriminatory alternative which will accomplish
the business purpose.2 9
Just as the circuits have split with respect to the order and burdens of
proof in class-based disparate treatment cases, they are also in disagreement
about the order and burdens of proof in disparate impact cases. The Third
Circuit embraces a Burdine-like approach in which a mere inference that a
discriminatory criterion was used in an employment decision is sufficient to
force the defendant to suggest a business justification. 30 The ultimate burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a
shifting standard, requiring the defendant to bear the burden of persuasion as
to its business necessity defense, once the plaintiff's prima facie case is
established. 3'
As in the disparate treatment cases discussed above, the shift of the
burden of persuasion to the employer in the disparate impact cases is
accompanied by a higher standard for the plaintiff's prima facie case. The
plaintiff must not merely raise an inference of discriminatory impact, but must
prove that the discriminatory impact exists. 3 2
The move by some appellate courts to adjust the standards of proof and
rebuttal in statistically based cases indicates an effort to place statistically
based evidence in a more workable analytical framework than that already
developed for individual cases. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has taken a step beyond the other appellate courts in developing an
appropriate analytical framework by proposing an integrated approach using
both disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis simultaneously.3 3
Section III of this article explores this new framework, and suggests how it
can be applied to the evaluation of defendants' most common attacks on
plaintiffs' multiple regression evidence. Using this framework in conjunction
with Title VII's continuing violation theory, plaintiffs may be able to extend
the power of their multiple regression approach to address a wider range of
discrimination.
III
THE Two KEY ARGUMENTS USED TO UNDERMINE PLAINTIFFS'
INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION
The courts are in agreement that in proper circumstances statistical
evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to support a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII. 34 On a theoretical level, the courts have
29. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
30. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334 (3d Cir. 1981).
31. Johnson v. Uncle B-n's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 967
(1982).
32. Id.
33. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1265-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
34. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). Of course, anecdotal
evidence from individuals is always highly desirable for its capacity to "bring the cold numbers
convincingly to life." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
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become increasingly receptive to complex statistical methodology such as
multiple regression analysis . 5 In practice, however, in many of the cases in
which plaintiffs have relied on multiple regression analysis they have failed to
prove their claims. 36 Sometimes, even under liberal standards for a prima
facie case, plaintiffs have failed to raise the necessary inference of
discrimination. Two key arguments have been used which undermine
plaintiffs' attempts to infer discrimination: the claim that plaintiffs have
omitted important explanatory variables from their regression equations and
the claim that plaintiffs' results are skewed by the inclusion of data on persons
hired before Title VII became effective. These problems are recurring ones,
and must be carefully addressed by those who aim to use multiple regression
analysis successfully.
A. The Omission of Explanatory Factors
In employment discrimination litigation relying on multiple regression
analysis, the most hotly contested issue revolves around the choice of
explanatory variables used in the regression equation.3 7 This issue is central
because the choice of variables can affect whether or not the analysis reveals
any significant discrimination.
Usually the plaintiffs' presentation of a prima facie case involves
regressions with salary or grade level as the dependent variable, and a set of
job related, experiential factors as the explanatory, or independent, variables.
These factors are designed to be indicators of an individual's job capability or
value to the employer. Presumably, compensation should be proportionate to
job capability. These assumptions are referred to as the human capital theory,
which has been studied and documented in the social sciences.3 8
Explanatory factors used by plaintiffs usually include one or more
education factors measured by years, degree obtained, or other job related
measurement. Experience may be represented by factors such as general
work experience, technical work experience, academic work experience,
35. Contrast the statements that statistics "appear to depend in large part on the side producing
them" in Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314, 324 (W.D.N.C. 1978), rev'd in
part on other grounds, aff'd in part, 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980), and comments regarding the
"inherently slippery nature" of statistical evidence in Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388,
395 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 809 (1982) with the statement in Segar v. Smith that requiring
anecdotal evidence to accompany all statistics would "reflect little more than a superstitious hostility
to statistical proof, a preference for the intuitionistic and individualistic over the scientific and
systemic." Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
36. E.g., Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984); Allen v. Prince George's County, 737
F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1984); Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
37. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, i06 S. Ct. 3000, 3008-09 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part for a unanimous court) (issue whether county-to-county differences in salary
increases were an appropriate factor) (discussed infra pp. 95-98); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
704 F.2d 613 (11 th Cir.) (issue whether job category was an appropriate factor), modified on other
grounds, 714 F.2d 1066 (11 th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. International Business Mach. Corp., 583 F. Supp.
875 (D. Md. 1984) (issue whether seniority, job level, and education were appropriate factors); see also
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (issue whether specialized experience was
appropriate factor), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
38. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
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experience with the present employer, managerial work experience, and so
forth. In the academic setting, factors such as number of publications or
academic rating of university granting degree may come into play. The choice
of explanatory factors must stem from a sound theory as to how employees in
the personnel system in question are actually evaluated.3 9 Such a theory must
initially be developed from studying the personnel system and, if possible,
getting the employer to admit which skills it values.
Defendants usually attempt to rebut plaintiffs' multiple regression
statistics by claiming that the plaintiffs have omitted important explanatory
factors from their regressions.
If the missing variable is differentially associated with a particular race or
sex, its omission may incorrectly lead to a conclusion that discrimination
exists. For example, a plaintiff may use only the factors "years of education"
and "years of work experience" to explain salary in a set of technical
engineering jobs. The regression analysis may show that sex has a statistically
significant effect on salary. The defendant may demonstrate that when a
factor for "engineering experience" is included in the analysis, it results in
eliminating sex as a statistically significant factor. The defendants' statistics
reveal that men are paid more because they have, on the average, more
engineering experience.
To take an actual example, in EEOC v. International Business Machines
Corp.,40 the plaintiffs presented multiple regression analyses which did not
include factors for seniority, job level, or education. This regression analysis
indicated race discrimination was present. The defendants, however,
persuaded the court that the omitted factors were essential, and that when
they were included in defendants' regression analysis the race discrimination
effect was eliminated. The court therefore found no discrimination.
While the above examples indicate that the omission of explanatory factors
can show discrimination where none exists, it is equally possible for the
inclusion of an unjustified explanatory factor to hide discrimination where it
does exist. Obviously, in a set ofjobs related to foreign language instruction,
the inclusion of a factor for engineering experience would be irrelevant.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of such a factor could reduce the apparent size and
statistical significance of the sex factor because the engineering factor is
closely correlated with and tends to act as a proxy for sex.
Because the inclusion of a factor which is correlated with sex or race can
reduce or eliminate the statistical significance of sex or race in a multiple
regression equation, a defendant wishing to diminish the inference of
discrimination may insist that plaintiff's statistics are methodologically flawed
by the exclusion of such a factor. Factors which serve as a proxy for sex may
not be immediately obvious, but they are, nonetheless, influential. For
example, "years of military service" is highly correlated with being male.
39. Id. at 1261-62.
40. 583 F. Supp. 875, 906 (D. Md. 1984).
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Some factors that are correlated with sex or race are so correlated because
the employer makes them that way by his own discrimination. Such factors
are "tainted" by being under the employer's subjective control, and should be
suspect. "Grade level" is a typical example. For instance, the defendant's
regression results may show that the factors education, experience, and grade
level all affect salary. The primary factor is grade level. It may appear that
men and women alike at grade level eight earn $800 per month, and at grade
level nine, both earn $900 per month, and so forth. Plaintiff's statistics, which
do not include the grade level factor, show that women are paid substantially
less than comparably qualified men. The grade level variable is tainted
because the employer determines the grade level of each employee. If women
are placed in a lower grade level than men with the same qualifications, then
the equal pay between men and women at the same grade level only masks
discrimination, which occurs in grade level assignment.
In Craik v. Minnesota State University Board,4 1 the plaintiff class of female
faculty members alleged wage discrimination on the basis of sex, and
demonstrated this discrimination with multiple regression analyses. The
appellate court overruled the magistrate's holding that "rank" should be
considered as a factor. Since the court found discrimination with regard to
rank assignment, rank was not a valid explanatory factor for salary.
In contrast, in Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority,42 the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' statistics for failing to account
for job category. The plaintiffs had argued that blacks and whites with
comparable qualifications were assigned to different jobs on the basis of race
so that job category ought not to be a valid factor. The court ignored the
argument, and apparently relied on its own belief that the different job
categories were simply not comparable.
A classic example of another frequently tainted factor is the job evaluation
score. Again, the employer is in control of the evaluation process, and it may
be highly discretionary. If women are consistently scored below similarly
performing men, then a multiple regression analysis which includes
performance evaluation scores may show no discrimination, as indicated in
the simple model below:
PLAINTIFF'S MODEL
Salary = $100 (education) + $50 (experience) + $300 (if male)
Ellen: $1400 = $100(12) + $50(4) + 0
Ed: $1700 = $100(12) + $50(4) + $300
Conclusion: Ed is paid more due to discrimination.
DEFENDANT'S MODEL
Salary = $100 (education) + $50 (experience) + $100 (performance equation score)
Ellen: $1500 = $100(12) + $50(4) + $100(l)
Ed: $1800 = $100(12) + $50(4) + $100(4)
41. 731 F.2d 465, 475 (8th Cir. 1984).
42. 704 F.2d 613, 623-24 (1 1th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 49: No. 4
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Conclusion: Ed is paid more due to his better performance.
In order to draw a conclusion as to whether or not "performace evaluation
score" in the last example, or any other disputed variable, should validly be
included in a regression equation, the court must consider evidence of subjec-
tivity of the factor, its degree of correlation with race or sex, its relationship to
the set of jobs in question, and whether the influence of the factor has been
adequately accounted for by other explanatory variables. The determination
of which party has the burden of presenting evidence or proving the various
arguments, rebuttals, and counterarguments related to the choice of variables
may well determine which party succeeds in the litigation.
B. Pre- and Post-Statutory Employment Decisions
Title VII originally became effective for private employers on July 2, 1965,
but it did not become applicable to government employers until the Act was
amended effective March 24, 1972. The issue of pre-1972 discrimination is
still a frequent problem in compensation and promotion cases, in which
multiple regression analysis is often used. A similar problem is raised by
discrimination which took place prior to the filing of a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. For purposes of back pay,
discrimination is only relevant up to two years prior to the date the EEOC
complaint was filed.
The following example illustrates how problems can arise. Suppose that
an employer based starting salary on only two legitimate factors, education
and experience, and valued each at $100 per year. Each year he gave
continuing employees a $100 raise. Prior to 1972, believing that men
deserved to be paid more, the employer discriminatorily paid starting male
employees $300 more than female employees with the same education and
experience. Mark and Mary both started work in 1970. Both had completed
high school (twelve years of education) and had one year of experience. For
13 total years of education and experience, Mary was started at $1,300 per
month. Mark, as a male, was paid an additional $300 so he started at $1,600
per month. In 1972, the employer stopped discriminating in his initial pay
setting. He continued his policy of giving employees a $100 raise each year.
As can be seen from Table 1, Mary started out $300 behind Mark in pay,
and she is still $300 behind in 1984.
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EDUCATION & EXPERIENCE
$3,000
$2,700
Salary
$1,600 Mary
$1,300-
13 27
(1970) (1984)
This situation raises an analytical problem. When did the discrimination take
place? Mary claims current discrimination in salary, pointing out that present
salary is directly correlated with education, experience, and sex as shown in
the equation below:
Salary = $100 (years education) + $100 (yrs. exp.) + $300 (if male)
For Mark: $3,000 = $100(12) + $100(14) + $300
For Mary: $2,700 = $100(12) + $100(14) + 0
The employer will argue that since 1972 he has treated Mark and Mary
alike in terms of raises, so there has been no illegal discrimination because
pre-1972 discrimination is not actionable.
This same issue is played out on a larger and more complex scale where
wages for a whole class of workers are at issue. Some were hired prior to
1972, some were not. The real-life factors influencing wages are not so clear-
cut as depicted above, though multiple regression anaysis is capable of devel-
oping a reasonable approximation. In a typical case, the plaintiff class will put
forward multiple regression analysis results indicating that a set of several
presumably legitimate factors, plus sex, act together to influence current sala-
ries. Defendants often attack plaintiffs' statistics for failing to exclude the
"effects" of pre-1972 discrimination. 43
43. Lehman v. Trout, 465 U.S. 1056, 1056-57 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segar v. Smith,
738 F.2d 1249, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 623 n. 14 (11 th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 1066 (11 th Cir. 1983);
Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566
F. Supp. 1166, 1182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769, 780
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One way to make sure that pre-19 7 2 or pre-statute of limitations hiring
decisions do not influence statistics on current salaries is to eliminate from the
data set all persons hired prior to the statutory period. Defendants benefit
from such a solution and plaintiffs suffer because all of the employees who
have been employed longest are cleansed from the data set, and these are the
persons on whom discrimination has had the greatest chance to work its
effects. Plaintiffs may well be unconvinced that employers, in post-1972 salary
setting, should be granted a license to continue wage differentials which were
begun in the pre-Act period, as illustrated by the Mark and Mary example.
Up to this point many courts have been reluctant to give weight to statis-
tics including persons hired prior to the actionable period. In Segar v. Smith, 44
for example, the plaintiffs, a class of black agents at the federal Drug Enforce-
ment Agency, alleged salary discrimination on the basis of race. They
presented multiple regression statistics using education, prior federal experi-
ence, prior nonfederal experience, and race as explanatory factors. When
they applied these factors to all agents present at the agency as of certain
dates, the race coefficient was statistically significant at the .001 level. The
plaintiffs also presented statistics including only agents hired after 1972. In
so doing, their statistical significance dropped to the .05 level. The court
stated: "Because the first regression measured disparities in the salaries of all
black agents, including those hired before 1972, the race coefficient in that
study may have reflected disparities resulting from the continuing effects of
discrimination that occurred prior to 1972, rather than actionable post-1972
discrimination." 45
By implication, the court indicates here that salary discrimination which
has extended from before 1972 to the present is nonactionable. The Segar
court admitted, however, that the second regression tended to understate the
amount of post-1972 discrimination because it only measured discrimination
among the newer agents. Those hired prior to 1972 could still suffer post-
1972 discrimination, and in fact are the very ones on whom discrimination is
'most likely to operate" since they are contending for higher level positions
and associated higher pay. 46
The plaintiffs in Melani v. Board of Higher Education47 similarly presented
both complete statistics and a set limited to post-1972 hires. The court com-
mented that this separate presentation was "to isolate those salary decisions
made after Title VII became applicable to defendant on March 24, 1972."48
Again, one may argue that persons hired prior to 1972 were still subject to
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allen v. Prince George's County, 538 F. Supp. 833, 849 (D. Md. 1982), aft'd, 737
F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1984). But see Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam) (discussed
infra pp. 95-98).
44. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
45. Id. at 1262.
46. Id. at 1262-63; see infra p. 79.
47. 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
48. Id. at 773 n.8.
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salary decisions made from 1972 to the present, and such salary decisions
should be actionable.
In both Melani and Segar, the plaintiffs' statistical showing was strong
enough to indicate statistically significant discrimination using the data lim-
ited to post-19 7 2 hires, although in both cases this limitation reduced the
degree of discrimination indicated. In Sobel v. Yeshiva University,49 however,
the plaintiffs' statistics for post-1972 hires showed no significant discrimina-
tion, while statistics based on the entire set of pre- and post-19 7 2 hires did
indicate salary discrimination. 50 The court cited with approval Gilinsky v.
Columbia University,5' in which a federal district court had dismissed an action
because the case was based largely on cumulative statistics and because "the
probative value of pre-1972 statistics is at best minimal." 52 The Sobel court
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of wage discrimination, in part because "the
appearance of discrimination in salaries during the relevant time period
resulted from lower salaries paid to female faculty members who had been
hired prior to 1972."53 In Allen v. Prince George's County,5 4 the court cited the
plaintiff's multiple regression statistics as having "fatal flaws" because they
did not exclude persons hired prior to 1972. 5 5
The exclusion from the data set of all persons hired more than two years
prior to the filing of an EEOC complaint is even more unreasonable than the
exclusion of persons hired prior to 1972. These individuals include persons
subjected to illegal discrimination after 1972 but who did not file any discrimi-
nation complaints. If the wages of all employees hired two years or more
prior to the filing of an EEOC complaint are eliminated from the data set it
may become impossible to demonstrate any discrimination because it takes
longer than two years for many forms of discrimination to manifest them-
selves at any significant level. If it were not for the several-year delays in get-
ting to court, the limitation of data to persons hired in the actionable period
would preclude most evidence of discrimination. In any case, the exclusion of
data on persons hired prior to the actionable period represents an unreason-
able limitation on plaintiffs'. ability to demonstrate present illegal
discrimination.
IV
TITLE VII THEORY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR STATISTICAL EVALUATION
The analytical approach to statistically based cases has varied from court
to court, but has often focused more on statistical methodology than on Title
49. 566 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), remanded, 797 F.2d 1478 (2d Cir. 1986); see infra note
126.
50. Id. at 1182.
51. 488 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 652 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1981).
52. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
53. Id.
54. 538 F. Supp. 833 (D. Md. 1982), aft'd, 737 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 849. Contrast Allen with the analysis in Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986)
(per curiam) (discussed infra pp. 95-98).
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VII theory. Yet, in cases involving statistics as complex as multiple
regression, it is particularly important to make sure that evaluation of the
statistics presented is in keeping with the goals and policy of Title VII. The
courts have developed an analytical structure under Title VII which includes
rules for placing the burden of proof, deciding when inferences should be
drawn, and deciding which party must bring forward evidence at each stage.
These evidentiary issues are critical where competing statistical arguments are
being made.
In addition, existing Title VII analysis includes a continuing violation
theory that permits plaintiffs to reach events prior to the statutory time limits
of Title VII where a pattern or series of related discriminatory events is
involved. Both Title VII evidentiary theory and the continuing violation
analysis can aid in the evaluation of statistically based wage discrimination
claims.
A. The Integrated Disparate Treatment/Impact Theory
A promising approach to analyzing class-based Title VII cases involving
multiple regression analysis uses disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories in combination to address a particular claim of discrimination. This
approach, which has only recently achieved explicit form in the District of
Columbia Circuit's 1984 decision in Segar v. Smith, 56 provides a structure for
evaluating both the problem of factors claimed to have been missed in the
regression equations and the problem of pre-1972 hires in the data set. The
structure can aid the court in determining which party has the burden of
presenting evidence on subissues within the litigation, and it also clarifies how
defenses should be evaluated. Following an explanation of how the combined
treatment/impact standard operates, it will be applied to the problems
previously discussed.
In its June 4, 1984, decision in Segar v. Smith, 57 the District of Columbia
Circuit, after "plumb[ing] some of the deepest complexities of Title VII
adjudication,- 58 concluded that "plaintiffs' pattern or practice disparate
treatment challenge to the employment system as a whole may also implicate
disparate impact analysis." 59 In class-based cases, both disparate treatment
and disparate impact analysis challenge a systemic pattern of discrimination.
While the plaintiff's prima facie case is designed to demonstrate the disparate
treatment of comparably qualified individuals, the employer may attempt to
defend against the inference of discrimination shown by explaining that a
specific neutral employment policy caused the differential treatment
indicated. At this point, a court will have before it all the elements of a
traditional disparate impact claim. Therefore, it is appropriate to require the
56. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1259.
59. Id. at 1266.
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defendant to prove the business necessity of maintaining the "neutral"
practice with the discriminatory effect.
The integrated disparate treatment/impact analysis proceeds as follows.
First, to support a prima facie case, the plaintiff class must raise an inference
of discriminatory treatment of class members, which is usually accomplished
by offering statistics showing that members of the protected class are in a less
favorable position than other comparably qualified persons. 60 These statistics
will generally be designed to show persuasive disparities, and will account for
the major potential nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparities shown.
By anticipating and discounting potential explanations, the plaintiffs' prima
facie case assumes some elements of the pretext stage of the typical individual
disparate treatment case. 6 1 The statistical results must meet generally
accepted standards for statistical significance, but " 'the appropriate degree of
refinement of the plaintiffs' statistical analysis . . . may depend on the quality
and control of the available data.' "62 Where fine-tuned statistical techniques
are used to evidence discriminatory treatment, "gross" disparities need not
be shown. 63
The defendant must bring forward evidence in rebuttal to the plaintiffs'
prima facie case. Such a rebuttal can either attack the plaintiffs' showing that
there is any disparity between the position of protected class members and
others, or the rebuttal may be in the form of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
explanation for the disparity observed. 64
In order to challenge the existence of the disparity, the defendant may
attack the methodology or significance of the plaintiffs' statistical
presentation. Although not clarified by the Segar court, it is evident that not
all methodological attacks relate to the "existence of the disparity" question.
For example, a methodological attack relating to the sample size, functional
form of the regression equation, or data tabulation procedures used, would
focus primarily on the "existence of disparity" issue. A methodological attack
based on the explanatory factors used in the regression would relate primarily
to the nondiscriminatory explanation issue discussed below. The defendant's
burden is measured by the strength of the plaintiffs' prima facie case. " 'The
defendant's evidence must do more than merely raise an issue of fact .... It
must cast sufficient doubt on the plaintiff's proof to cause the trier of fact to
conclude that the plaintiff has not proved discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence.' "65
The defendant may choose to defend itself by offering a legitimate
nondiscriminatory explanation for the observed disparity-by explaining, for
60. Id. at 1267.
61. Id. at 1274.
62. Id. at 1276 (quoting Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S.
1056 (1984)).
63. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1278.
64. Id. at 1267-68.
65. Id. at 1268 (quoting Vyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 663 (N.D. Tex.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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example, that the plaintiffs have not accounted for an important job
qualification. Unlike the typical Burdine sequence in which a mere articulation
of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is sufficient for rebuttal, the Segar
court held that the defendant's rebuttal in a class-based case must be "clear
and reasonably specific," 66 and must be based on the presentation of
sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact to decline to draw the inference
of discrimination from the plaintiffs' proof.6 7
In proposing a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for observed
classwide disparities in treatment, the defendant may well rely on some
specific employment policy, practice, or requirement which, although facially
neutral, accounts for the disparate effect on the protected class. In so doing,
the defendant has added the final necessary element for a disparate impact
case. The plaintiffs' evidence of disparity and the defendant's evidence of a
specific employment practice which is responsible for that disparity combine
to create the disparate impact issue.
Having offered such a business practice as an explanation for the disparate
result, the defendant must proceed to defend the business practice as a job
related business necessity, as required by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.68 The
burden of proof in defending such a business practice is on the defendant.
This burden is justified by the defendant's greater knowledge of its own
business practices. While not addressed in the Segar opinion, presumably the
plaintiffs, as in other disparate impact cases, may rebut the defendant's claim
of business necessity by showing that a less discriminatory alternative exists
which could serve the defendant's business purpose. 69
Taking a discrimination case as a whole, "[w]hen the volleying is over ... a
Title VII case is like all others: the trier of fact must weigh the plaintiff's
proof and the defendant's rebuttal and decide whether the plaintiffs have met
the ultimate burden of persuasion that the law imposes on them."' 70 The
proposed integrated disparate treatment/impact structure is admirably suited
to address the succession of issues arising in statistically based cases.
1. Application of the Integrated Disparate Treatment/Impact Standard to the Issue of
"Omitted Explanatory Factors". While not entirely necessary for its decision in
Segar, the appellate court did indicate how its integrated disparate
treatment/impact standard could apply in one instance where the defendants
had alleged that the plaintiffs' multiple regression analyses had omitted an
important explanatory factor.71
The plaintiffs presented a prima facie case relying on multiple regression
analysis which accounted for several potential nondiscriminatory factors, but
which still revealed significant discrimination. The defendants claimed that
66. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1268.
67. Id. at 1269.
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
69. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
70. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1286.
71. Id. at 1287-88.
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plaintiffs' regression analysis was flawed for failing to include "specialized
experience" as an explanatory factor. The court rejected the defendants'
claims, primarily because the factor was so vague and immeasurable that
plaintiffs could not be faulted for not including it. Furthermore, since the
factor was so subjective, it could possibly have served as a pretext for
discrimination. Finally, since the defendants offered no statistics of their own
to show that inclusion of the factor would account for the discrimination
shown, the defendants' rebuttal simply did not, as a matter of law, rise to the
level necessary to defeat plaintiffs' prima facie case.
In addition, the court pointed out that if the defendants had rebutted the
plaintiffs' prima facie case by making a credible showing that the factor really
stood for "prior law enforcement experience," and that such a factor
explained the salary disparity shown, then the defendants would have done no
more than create a disparate impact case. In effect, the defendants would
have shown that the prior law enforcement experience requirement was a
facially neutral employment practice with a disparate negative impact on
blacks. The defendants would then have had to justify such a requirement by
proof of job relatedness.
While the portion of the Segar court's opinion which deals with the
application of disparate impact theory in the "omitted factor" context is
actually dicta, the logic of the proposed application is compelling. This
framework could be applied to any omitted factor attack on the plaintiffs'
multiple regression analyses. For example, if an employer claimed that
"engineering experience" was a crucial variable omitted from the plaintiffs'
regressions, the defendant would first have to show through its own statistics
that inclusion of the engineering factor accounted for the discrimination
previously shown. In so doing, the employer would have indicated that
engineering experience is a facially neutral factor with a disparate negative
effect on the plaintiff class. The defendant would then have the burden of
proving the business necessity of using engineering experience as a factor
affecting salary rates. In a set of technical jobs, the employer may well be able
to justify the legitimate business purpose of rewarding engineering
experience. In a set of jobs where engineering experience had little or no
relevance, the employer obviously could not show business necessity. Either
way, an orderly series of inquiries serves to isolate the dispositive issues.
The integrated disparate treatment/impact approach should facilitate even
the most difficult omitted factor issues, such as the claim that "job level"
should have been included in a plaintiff's regression analysis. Courts have
reached different decisions on this issue. 72 Although they have relied on
precedent from prior decisions, the focus should be on the facts of the
individual case. The proposed framework would help focus such as inquiry.
First, the defendant would have to demonstrate that the inclusion of a "job
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. International Business Machs. Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875, 906 (D. Md. 1984)
(court critical of plaintiff's statistics because "job level" not included); Craik v. Minnesota State Univ.
Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 475 (8th Cir. 1984) (court found "rank" not a valid explanatory factor).
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level" factor would account for the discrimination inferred by the plaintiff's
statistics. As a neutral factor with disparate impact on salary, job level would
have to be justified by the defendant as a business necessity for salary setting.
If the defendant merely claimed that job level was a "convenient" basis for
setting salaries, such justification might not rise to the level of "proof of
business necessity." In any case, the plaintiff could attempt to show that
other, less discriminatory measures of the value of an employee exist which
could serve the employer's salary setting needs, such as education,
experience, and quality of performance. If "job level" is a measure of the
value of an employee, the employer would be in the best position to evaluate
that measure. Finally, if in the course of the class-based lawsuit, the plaintiff
also proved discrimination in promotions, then the employer could not even
point to job level as a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation. Job level
itself would be a product of promotion discrimination, and a pretext for salary
discrimination.
In cases where the alleged omitted factor is a potentially subjective factor
such as performance evaluation score, the proposed standard places the
burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the performance evaluation
system is legitimately job related. The defendant, claiming that performance
evaluations are neutral, can present evidence on the validity and objectivity of
the evaluation process. If the employer can prove the system is job related,
then the omitted factor provides a legitimate explanation for the
discrimination that otherwise would be inferred.
2. The Application of the Integrated Disparate Treatment/Impact Standard to the Issue
of Prestatutory Hires in the Data Set. As discussed previously, 73 defendants
frequently attack plaintiffs' multiple regression analyses as having been
skewed by data pertaining to persons hired prior to 1972 or prior to the
actionable reach of Title VII. While the Segar court did not apply the
integrated disparate treatment/impact framework to this question, it is
certainly an appropriate issue for the analytical framework.
Once again, for example, a plaintiff class may raise an inference of wage
discrimination using regression statistics, based on a data set pertaining to all
employees in a set of jobs, including both pre- and post-1972 hires. The
defendant, in rebuttal, may propose a legitimate nondiscriminatory
explanation for the apparent wage disparity: it is merely the result of the
effects of nonactionable discrimination which took place prior to 1972. Under
the analytical structure proposed in Segar, mere articulation of this
explanation is not sufficient. 74 The defendant must demonstrate that if the
effect of pre-1972 discrimination is accounted for, the statistical showing of
discrimination will be eliminated. This process results in some interesting
consequences.
73. See supra section III; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam)
(discussed infra pp. 95-98).
74. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1269.
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First, the defendant must prove the existence and extent of pre-Act
discrimination to prove that it was a factor affecting post-1972 statistics. 75
This places the defendant in what could be an embarrassing dilemma. The
defendant must admit to pre-Act discrimination, which if not illegal, is not now
something to advertise. This admission may be particularly embarrassing for
discrimination which occurred after Title VII went into effect, but prior to the
statute of limitations period on the particular case. Such discrimination was
illegal; the employer merely did not get caught.
Second, by admitting to pre-Act discrimination, a defendant sets itself up
for the plaintiff's claim that if its personnel policies have remained basically
unchanged, then this discrimination has persisted into the actionable period
as a continuing violation. 76 This admission is especially dangerous for the
defendant where pre-statute of limitations period discrimination is involved.
While it is possible that an employer stopped discriminating in 1972 due to
the passage of the Title VII Amendments, which made it illegal to
discriminate, it is not plausible that an employer stopped discriminating on
September 2, 1981, or whatever other random date falls two years prior to the
date the EEOC charge was filed. Since the employer did not know then that a
charge would be filed two years later, the date would have had no significance
at the time.
Finally, measurement of the extent of pre-1972 discrimination (so that it
could be factored out of present discrimination) would require a defendant to
do a multiple regression analysis on pre-1972 wages for men and women to
see what value the sex factor had at that time. In order not to make the pre-
1972 sex factor artificially small, the defendants would have to choose their
explanatory factors in an unbiased manner. If they could then prove, for
example, that $300 worth of the present wage gap was the effect of pre-Act
discrimination, they could argue for subtracting it from the $350 wage gap
evident in post-1972 statistics on pre-1972 hires. But the explanatory factors
the defendants used for the pre-1972 regression would essentially be an
admission that such factors were valid to measure wage rates to reveal post-
1972 discrimination, absent a drastic change in personnel policies.
Alternatively, plaintiffs could rebut the defendants' claims that pre-Act
discrimination had an effect on post-1972 results by using the defendants'
proposed post-1972 explanatory factors on pre-1972 wage rates. If the
defendants claimed they did discriminate prior to 1972 and such
discrimination was not revealed using the defendants own proposed post-
1972 factors, then the credibility of the factors the defendants proposed for
the purpose of rebutting the inference of discrimination in the actionable
period would be greatly diminished.
Presuming the defendants could measure, and therefore factor out, the
relationship of present wage rates to pre-1972 wage discrimination, the
defendants would be able to demonstrate, in effect, that pre-1972
75. See id. at 1281.
76. See infra section IV B.
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discrimination is a facially neutral factor with a disparate negative impact on
the protected group. Under the treatment/impact framework, the defendant
would then be obliged to prove the business necessity of relying in part on
pre-1972 discrimination to set present wage rates.
It is highly unlikely that there is any way to prove the business necessity of
such a practice. Wages which are based partly on pre-1972 discrimination can
never be shown to be as equally job related as wages based entirely on
objective qualifications. Any wage system based on qualifications and not on
pre-Act discrimination will be a less discriminatory alternative to a wage
system based in part on pre-Act discrimination. Thus, under the integrated
disparate treatment/impact analytical framework, it is clear that a present
reliance on pre-1972 discrimination constitutes present illegal discrimination
which should be remediable under Title VII.
B. The Continuing Violation Theory
The primary analytical argument which has been used to support the
exclusion of data from prestatutory hires in the multiple regression data set
has been that these data include the "effects" of pre-Act discrimination which
is not remediable under Title VII. 7 7 The courts appear to be in agreement
that the present effects of pre-Act discrimination are not actionable, 78 but
present discrimination that is part of a continuing pattern of discrimination
which began prior to 1972 is actionable. Such discrimination is referred to as
a "continuing violation. ' 79 The continuing violation theory has been largely
ignored in wage discrimination cases based on multiple regression analysis,
but the approach is admirably suited to address the persistent excuse of
nonactionable, pre-Act discrimination.
The leading case on the issue of continuing effects of discrimination is
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans. 80 In Evans, a stewardess was terminated under
United's nonmarriage policy. Several years later, after the policy was
determined to be illegal and had been abandoned, the stewardess reapplied
and was rehired. However, she was granted no seniority based on her prior
work for United. The Supreme Court held that there had been no violation of
Title VII because anyone, male or female, who left United's employment and
then came back lost all prior accrued seniority.8 ' The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim of continuing discrimination because her challenge to the
policy under which she was terminated was untimely. The termination
therefore, had no legal significance as an illegal event, and she could prove no
present violation. 82
77. See supra section III B.
78. See, e.g., Bazemore v.,Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam) (discussed infra pp. 95-98);
Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
79. See Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070, 1074-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
80. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Contrast Evans with Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per
curiam) (discussed infra) pp. 95-98.
81. Id. at 557.
82. Id. at 558.
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The Evans case has been interpreted as defeating the theory that a
continuing effect of past discrimination is presently actionable. 83 Nonetheless,
many courts have sought to narrow this interpretation, and have upheld the
concept that a continuing pattern of discrimination from prior to 1972, or
prior to the two year back pay limitation of Title VII, is still actionable.
In Milton v. Weinberger, 84 the District of Columbia Circuit set out criteria for
determining a continuing violation of Title VII. Such a violation consists of
" a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations
period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during
the statutory period.' "85 The discrimination "may not be 'limited to isolated
incidents, but must pervade a series or pattern of events which continue to
within' the filing period."8 6
In the Mark and Mary example set out in Section 111,87 both employees
were equally qualified, but Mary was discriminatorily underpaid by $300 when
she was hired, prior to 1972, and the wage gap persisted into the actionable
period. In that example, and in the many actual cases like it, it seems only fair
to consider the discrimination to be continuing. There is current
discrimination since Mary is treated less favorably every month she is paid
$300 less than Mark. The employer could have adjusted this difference at any
time but did not do so, to its own financial benefit. The case clearly falls
within the generally accepted criteria for continuing violation since the year-
to-year salary setting is a series of related acts which are part of a
discriminatory system that began prior to and extended into the statutory
period. The facially neutral system of granting $100 raises per year to both
Mary and Mark operates to maintain the perpetual $300 wage gap.
If there is a reasonable distinction to be drawn between "perpetuating the
effects of pre-Act discrimination" and "continuing violations" in the
compensation context, perhaps it can be demonstrated by the following
example:
In 1970,Jane and Jim apply for similar jobs with Employer. Employer has
a policy of not hiring women so he only hires Jim. All employees start at
$1,000 per month and receive a $100 raise each year. In 1972, Title VII
makes discrimination illegal. Jane applies again and is hired. In 1974, Jim's
salary is $1,400 per month, while Jane's salary is only $1,200 per month. The
$200 wage gap is a continuing effect of pre-1972 discrimination. In this
instance the employer uses a neutral policy of basing all salaries on $1,000
83. Courts have relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Evans that "[r]espondent is correct
in pointing out that the seniority system gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. But
United was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent failed to file a charge of
discrimination." Id. at 559.
84. 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 1075 (quoting B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 232
(Supp. 1979)).
86. Milton, 645 F.2d at 1076 (quoting Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 473 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
87. See supra section III B. For a similar fact situation, see Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000
(1986) (per curiam) (discussed infra pp. 95-98).
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plus an additional $100 for each year of service. This neutral policy is job
related because each additional year of service presumably makes an
employee worth $100 more to the employer. It is true that but for the pre-Act
discrimination, Jane would have two more years of service-but the pre-Act
discrimination was not illegal. Jane is now being paid the same as any man
who began work in 1972 when she did. Her value to her employer is only
based on two years of service, and she is being paid what she is worth. Thus,
there is no present discrimination. This model is analogous to the facts of
Evans.
In the Mark and Mary example, Mary is not now being paid the same as a
man who began work at the same time she did. Her present value to the
employer is exactly the same as Mark's since they are similarly situated in
terms of qualifications and experience. Paying Mary less than Mark now
should, therefore, be viewed as a continuing violation, not just the "effect" of a
pre-1972 act.
Defendants frequently raise the argument that pre-Act factors are entirely
responsible for present wage discrimination. Such a defense presents
employers as mere pawns in the hands of their own personnel policies, unable
to change what was begun years before. Plaintiffs must directly confront this
rationale so that courts are not blinded by seemingly discrimination-free
statistics which have been purged of all data on persons hired prior to 1972,
or of all data on persons hired prior to two years before the complaint was
filed.
Since members of the plaintiff class who were hired prior to the actionable
period may well have a valid continuing violation claim, the plaintiff class
should not have to limit itself to presenting statistics on individuals hired
during the actionable period. In our Mark and Mary example, even if the
employer stopped his practice of starting male employees at a higher wage
than comparably qualified female employees in 1972, a look at post-1972
hires only will reveal no discrimination at all, yet females hired prior to 1972
are still suffering discrimination with respect to the pre-1972 male hires. To
detect this discrimination, it is necessary to look at data that include pre-1972
hires.
In Sobel v. Yeshiva University,8s the court was critical of plaintiffs' statistical
presentation, which included data on pre-1972 hires. The court, quoting
from Gilinsky v. Columbia University,8 ° stated that " 'the probative value of pre-
1972 statistics is at best minimal.' "90 Applying the terminology of "pre-1972
statistics" to post-1972 data on present salaries, including persons hired prior
to 1972, could lead to substantive errors in analysis.
88. 566 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd per curiam, 797 F.2d 1478 (2d Cir. 1986). In Sobel,
the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court in light of Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct.
3000 (1986) (per curiam), to consider the significance of pre-Act discrimination and the evidentiary
weight to be afforded multiple regression analysis. Sobel, 797 F.2d at 1479.
89. 488 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
90. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd per curiam, 797 F.2d
1478 (2d Cir. 1986).
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Perhaps the confusion between "pre-1972 statistics" and multiple
regression statistics including individuals hired prior to 1972 indicates some
misunderstanding of how multiple regression analysis works. As used to
model salary setting, multiple regression does not cumulate data taken at
different periods of time. To show discrimination in salaries for 1974, 1975,
and 1976, for example, one must run three separate regressions. Each one
includes only salaries paid in the particular year in question. Graphically,
multiple regression methodology is analogous to Table 3, which shows the
present salary of a class of individuals, not Table 2, which merely shows the
salary progression, over time, of two people. While Table 2 obviously contains
pre-1972 data, Table 3 does not.
SALARY OVERTIME
Mark
"- Mary
1971 1972
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Individuals Qualifications in 1980
The Sobel court's language could lead to confusion between pre-1972
statistics and data on pre-1972 hires. The statistics presented by the plaintiffs
in Sobel were based on salaries for the relevant years 1974 through 1979, and
thus they were not pre-1972 statistics. They happened to include the 1974 to
1979 salaries of persons hired prior to 1972. They revealed that the employer
was, in the relevant time period, paying women less than comparably qualified
men.91 Again, an employer's pre-1972 discrimination should not provide it
with license to discriminate indefinitely. Although the employees hired before
1972 are probably barred from collecting the additional wages they should
have been paid in the pre-1972 period, they should not be barred from
collecting additional wages discriminatorily withheld from 1974 through
1979, when Title VII was in full effect.
The Sobel court's quote on "pre-1972 statistics" from Gilinsky was
misplaced. Gilinsky was a hiring discrimination case. There, the plaintiffs
attempted to prove discrimination by showing that a university had an
extremely low percentage of women on the faculty. Most people on the
faculty, however, were hired prior to 1972. Among post-1972 hires, women
were equitably represented. Therefore, statistics on pre-1972 hiring
decisions were largely irrelevant in the context of a post-1972 hiring
discrimination case.
In Valentino v. United States Postal Service,92 a case including a discrimination
claim based on multiple regression analysis, the plaintiff actually attempted to
91. The Sobel court found the plaintiff's statistics to be unpersuasive for other reasons as well,
however. Id. at 1178-82.
92. 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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invoke the continuing violation theory. The approach was rejected in the
District of Columbia Circuit's 1982 opinion, but only because the continuing
violation theory did not fit the particular circumstances of the case. 93 Due to
the Title VII limitations period, based on the filing date of the complaint, only
post-1976 discrimination was normally actionable in the case. The plaintiff
wanted to use the continuing violation theory to reach the 1974 to 1976
period. The employer, however, had instituted a totally new promotion
system in 1976: post-1976 employment decisions were not part of a
continuing pattern or system of discrimination extending from the
prestatutory period. Additionally, the court questioned the plaintiff's
qualifications to represent the class of persons discriminated against prior to
1976. On the facts, the continuing violation theory simply did not apply. It
therefore could not be used to defeat the criticism made at the trial court
level, that plaintiff's statistics failed to factor out the effects of prestatutory
discrimination. 94
The issue of data on pre-1972 hires was a central feature of the recent
series of decisions culminating in the Supreme Court case of Lehman v.
Trout.95 If not carefully read, these cases could be wrongly interpreted as
giving Supreme Court approval to the concept that wage discrimination that
has extended from prior to the actionable period is not now actionable. In
fact, the Trout decisions left open the question of whether a continuing
violation theory might be applied in wage discrimination cases if evidenced by
multiple regression analysis.
The Trout case was originally tried in the District of Columbia District
Court in 1981 under the name Trout v. Hidalgo.96 In his district court opinion,
Judge Harold Green did not specifically address the continuing violation
theory, but he appeared to embrace some of its assumptions. The plaintiffs
presented multiple regression analyses of the salaries of the professional
employees at a naval computer operations center. Along with education and
experience factors, sex proved to be a statistically significant explanatory
factor affecting salary rates. Women were paid $2,200 to $3,500 per year less
than comparably qualified males. The plaintiffs' data base included salaries
during the period from 1972 through 1979 of employees hired both before
and after Title VII became applicable to the government in 1972.
While the court stated that "discriminatory conduct which occurred solely
prior to March 24, 1972, is not directly actionable," 97 it noted that "[i]t is
likely that . . . discrimination before 1972, even if coupled with neutral
93. Id. at 65.
94. Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F. Supp. 917, 955 (D.D.C. 1981), af'd, 674 F.2d
56 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
95. Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 879-80.
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employment practices since then, produced actionable continuing
discriminatory effects after 1972."98 The court found the situation
analogous to the effect of racial discrimination by labor unions that is succeeded by
use of neutral seniority rules, or of discriminatory voting registration practices
followed by neutral, but particularly arduous, requirements. In such cases, courts
have not hesitated to hold that "freezing" the effects of prior discrimination is
actionable. 9 9
The court indicated that disparities in grade level, and thus salary, which
remained over several years could be attributed to the employer because over
time such disparities would tend to demonstrate inequitable promotion
practices. If women failed to catch up to their proper grade level, it could
have been due to promotion regulations which "locked in the effects of the
earlier discrimination." 0 0
On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the government employer
argued that plaintiffs' regression statistics failed to make out a prima facie case
because they ignored the time limitations embodied in Title VII. Judge Harry
Edwards noted that "absent a valid claim of a continuing violation,"'' Title
VII does not apply to pre-1972 discrimination by the government. Reviewing
the lower court holding he stated:
The District Court concluded that plaintiffs need not factor out time-barred
discrimination because defendants may be held liable for the continuing effects of that
discrimination. This theory was once in vogue, but is flatly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in Hazelwood School District v. United States and United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans. 102
There are several analytical problems presented here, arising from
procedure, theory, and semantics. With respect to procedure, the District of
Columbia Circuit explicitly stated in Milton v. Weinberger' 03 that a plaintiff
wishing to make use of the continuing violation theory must address the issue
at the trial stage.'0 4 It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. If the
Trout plaintiffs did not specifically raise the issue in the district court, the
theory was probably deemed waived by the appellate court, despite the
district court's comment regarding the "continuing discriminatory effects."' 10 5
Judge Edwards' reference to the absence of a "valid claim of continuing
violation" simply indicates that in that case such a claim had not been raised.
With respect to theory, the Hazelwood School District v. United States 106 and
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans 107 cases are not precisely on point. Neither of
those cases eliminated the continuing violation theory. The Hazelwood case
98. Id. at 880.
99. Id. at 880 n.19.
100. Id. at 885.
101. Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d at 1104.
102. Id. (citations omitted). Contrast these cases with Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986)
(per curiam) (discussed infra) pp. 95-98.
103. 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
104. Id. at 1077.
105. Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. at 880.
106. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
107. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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was yet another hiring discrimination case in which the plaintiffs attempted to
show discrimination in the period from 1972 through 1974 by showing that
less than two percent of the teachers working at the school district at that time
were black. This is a classic example of the effect of pre-Act discrimination.
The court pointed out that statistics showing the school district's post-Act
hiring might rebut the inference of discrimination. Obviously, even if the
district hired its new teachers without discrimination, the district-wide
proportion of black teachers would remain low in the immediate post-Act
period. An employer who, after 1972, "made all its employment decisions in
a wholly nondiscriminatory way would not violate Title VII even if it had
formerly maintained an all-white work force." 108  A "wholly
nondiscriminatory way" is not the same as a wholly neutral way, for as Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. 109 teaches, even neutral policies may have a discriminatory
impact, and may be challenged on that basis. The district court in Trout
evidently did not view the employer's post-Act practices as wholly
nondiscriminatory. The statistical rationale of Hazelwood simply does not
apply to the Trout facts.
With respect to semantics, the Trout district court did speak of the
"continuing discriminatory effects,"'' 0 "freezing the effects,"''' and "locking
in the effects"' 1 2 of prior discrimination. This language, particularly the key
word, "effects," is the very language that was used to express the now rejected
"perpetuating the effects of pre-Act discrimination" theory."l 3 Whether the
district court used this language intentionally, or merely failed to heed the
semantical differences between "continuing discriminatory effects" and
"continuing violation," the court's word choice identified its opinion as
embracing the now unpopular "continuing effects" theory.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but in a summary disposition of
the case, reflected in a brief memorandum opinion, simply remanded the case
to the court of appeals to be remanded back to the district court for a
determination of "what evidentiary value respondents' and petitioners'
statistical evidence has in light of the court of appeals' conclusions of law
concerning employment decisions that are not actionable in this case." 114
The Supreme Court was apparently concerned that the appellate court had
found facts which should have been found in the first instance by the district
court. The Supreme Court did not review the record in the case and,
according to a dissenting opinion by Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan,
merely second-guessed the judgment of the appellate court "after the most
108. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309.
109. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
110. Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. at 880.
111. Id. at 880 n.19.
112. Id. at 885.
113. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). But see Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S.
Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam).
114. Lehman v. Trout, 465 U.S. at 1056.
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truncated of presentations." ' 1 5 The dissenters believed the appellate court
did not improperly find facts, but rather relied on facts already cited by the
district court."16
Clearly, the Supreme Court reached no considered opinion as to which
employment decisions were "not actionable in this case,""l 7 although the
dissenters indicated that they included "pre-1972 discrimination." 18 The
majority's memorandum opinion thus did not address whether the post-1972
disparities in grade level of pre-1972 hires were actionable or not. The
minority, who commented on the case at some length, stated that "the
evidence concerning the actions of [the government employer] alone still
demonstrated the existence of unlawful discrimination . . . . [D]uring the
post-Act period, female employees were paid consistently less than male
employees even when the factors used by the Civil Service Commission to
make placement decisions were considered."" 9 The three dissenting Justices
cited the district court's determination that "disparities in grade level
remaining over several years could still be properly attributable to [the
government]"' 120 and that, in such case, the failure to "promote equitably
individuals who were discriminated against at hiring . . . would constitute
direct discrimination."' 12 1 In summary, it appears that at least these three
Justices could find present discrimination in a case where pre-Act
discriminatory treatment continued into the post-Act period.
In the recent Segar v. Smith 122 decision, the District of Columbia Circuit
stepped carefully around the issue of pre-1972 hires in the data set, in light of
the Supreme Court's remand of Trout relating to the evidentiary value of
nonactionable employment decisions. The Segar court did not find it
necessary to exclude pre-1972 hires from the data set because at trial the
defendants had provided no evidence that doing so would alter the inference
of discrimination shown by plaintiffs' statistics. The defendants could not
show that pre-1972 discrimination "affected" the post-1972 figures because
the defendants neither admitted nor proved that they discriminated against
blacks prior to 1972.123 The Segar court did hold that the district court would
have erred had it concluded that disparities resulting from the continuing
effects of pre-1972 discrimination were actionable. In a footnote, however,
the appellate court indicated that it was a correct statement of the law that
continuing effects of pre-1972 discrimination are actionable under a
continuing violation theory. 124 The court further noted that it did not think
the record supported a continuing violation finding under the Segar facts, but
115. Id. at 1062 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1057-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1056.
118. Id. at 1057 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
119. Id. at 1060 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1060 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 U.S. 2357 (1985).
123. Id. at 1281 n.23.
124. Id. at 1281 n.22.
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it did not indicate why not. Since neither was pre-1972 discrimination
admitted or proved, nor was an effort ever made to prove a continuing pattern
of discrimination, there are obvious reasons why the record could have been
insufficient to support a continuing violation theory. The Segar court clearly
did not exclude the potential use of the continuing violation theory in all
statistically based wage discrimination cases.
In fact, in the damages section of the Segar decision, the court of appeals
concluded that the record contained insufficient facts to measure back pay
because it could not determine whether all of the plaintiffs' regression race
coefficients measured post-1972 discrimination. The court stated: "It may
... be that the portion of the disparity that reflects continuing effects of pre-
1972 discrimination might be actionable on a continuing violation theory. "125
Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine if a
continuing violation had occurred or if there had been nonactionable
continuing effects. Back pay was to be computed accordingly. In this
discussion, the court of appeals clearly opened the door to the potential use of
the continuing violation theory in future multiple regression based wage
discrimination claims. When used in combination with the integrated
disparate treatment/impact analytical structure, the continuing violation
theory provides plaintiffs with a powerful approach to addressing persistent
and pervasive wage discrimination problems.
V
CONCLUSION
Multiple regression analysis provides plaintiffs with a sophisticated and
powerful evidentiary tool for detecting even subtle forms of discrimination.
The evidence provided by such a statistical technique is only persuasive,
however, if the methodology behind the numbers is credible.
This article has presented two analytical approaches which provide a
framework for assessment of statistical credibility. These approaches, the
integrated disparate treatment/impact theory and the continuing violation
theory, are particularly useful in evaluating typical questions as to omitted
variables and prestatutory influences on the data set. As the analytical
approach used in cases based on multiple regression analysis rises to the level
of sophistication required by the evidentiary method, the full potential of
multiple regression techniques to alleviate hidden forms of discrimination
should be realized.
POSTSCRIPr
This article was prepared for a symposium in the fall of 1984. Since that
time, a number of federal courts have considered multiple regression statistics
125. Id. at 1292.
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in the context of discrimination cases. 126 Most notably, in the recent case of
Bazemore v. Friday, 127 the United States Supreme Court addressed two of the
central issues discussed in this article: missing factors and pre-Act
discrimination.
The Bazemore case involved claims of race-based wage discrimination
among the employees of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service
(Extension Service), which is operated as a division of North Carolina State
University. Prior to August, 1965, the Extension Service was divided into a
white branch and a "Negro branch."' 28 The salaries of the employees in the
white branch were generally higher than the salaries of the employees in the
Negro branch. After Title VII became effective, the two branches were
merged but wage disparities continued. 2 9
126. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam), aff'g in part, vacating in part,
751 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984). Bazemore is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 127-45. For a
similar analysis, see Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1389 (5th Cir. 1986), which upheld
the district court's criticism of plaintiffs' regression analysis in a housing discrimination case because
of plaintiffs' failure to include factors such as the crime rate and school quality in the regression
equation to predict property appraisal value. For another example, see Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 797
F.2d 1478, 1478 (2d Cir. 1986), which remanded the district court's decision (discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 88-90), for reconsideration of effects of pre-Act discrimination and missing
factors in regression, in light of Bazemore. Additionally, see Griffin v. Board of Regents, 795 F.2d
1281, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1986), which, one month before the Bazemore decision, upheld the district
court's rejection of plaintiff female teachers' statistics because they failed to factor out the effects of
pre-1972 decisions and did not control for possession of a doctorate degree. For a contrasting view,
see Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985), which reversed and remanded the
district court's rejection of plaintiffs' multiple regression statistics. In Lewis, the circuit court found
that the mere failure of plaintiffs' statistical analysis to rule out every conceivable non-discriminatory
factor as an explanation for the observed wage disparity, insufficient to reject the statistics. Id. at
575. The court pointed out that the defendant failed to demonstrate that any additional factor
worked into the regression analysis would reduce the apparent discrimination. Id. Notably, this
decision was written by Judge Phillips, who wrote the dissent in the Fourth Circuit's Bazemore
decision, 751 F.2d at 688 (Phillips, J., dissenting in part), discussed infra text accompanying notes
133-42. For another example of a court approval of plaintiff's statistics, see EEOC v. McCarthy, 768
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985) (upholding the district court's reliance on statistical evidence in a wage
discrimination case including data for years prior to the actionable reach of the Equal Pay Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1975). The court stated: "a decision to hire an individual at a discriminatory low
salary can, upon payment of each subsequent paycheck, continue to violate the employee's rights."
768 F.2d at 3 (quoting Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 747 (1st Cir. 1982)). For a related
view, see Ende v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 176, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1985), which upheld a voluntary
pay equity adjustment scheme based on a regression type methodology. In Ende, the university's pay
equity adjustment scheme was challenged by male faculty members as a violation of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 757 F.2d at 179. The university had employed a regression-
type methodology to dole out pay increases for female faculty members, based on objective factors.
Subsequently, multiple regression analysis indicated that a sex-based wage disparity favoring males
had existed prior to the introduction of the pay equity adjustment scheme. Id. at 180. For a
discussion of statistical methodology, the probative value of statistical evidence, and burdens of
proof, see Coates v. Johnson &Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 539, 548 (7th Cir. 1985), which upheld the
district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' statistical evidence was not probative because of the failure
to include employees' disciplinary records, and other methodological problems. The Coates court
would place the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to show that an alleged explanatory factor used
by defendant's expert is itself a product of the employer's bais, reflecting a typical disparate
treatment framework. Id. at 544. The court did not consider applying disparate impact analysis
which would require the defendant to prove the business necessity of the factor in question.
127. 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (per curiam).
128. Id. at 3003 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous Court).
129. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous Court).
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Suit was filed in 1971. The Supreme Court noted that much of the
plaintiffs' evidence at trial consisted of multiple regression analyses of wage
rates.' 30 The plaintiffs used four explanatory factors: race, education, tenure,
and job title. These analyses "purported to demonstrate" that race had a
statistically significant effect on salary in 1974 and 1975.'3' The district court
ruled against the plaintiffs in all respects, and generally viewed the Extension
Service as having conducted itself in a nondiscriminatory manner since it
became subject to Title VII.' 3 2
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision,
reasoning that the Extension Service was under no obligation to eliminate any
race-based salary disparity which originated prior to 1972 when Title VII
became applicable to public employers. 33 The court stated: "The plaintiffs
claim that the pre-Act discriminatory difference in salaries should have been
affirmatively eliminated but has not. We do not think this is the law."' 34
Thus, the court found that despite the admitted discriminatory wage system
which was in place prior to Title VII, "the lingering effects of pre-Act
discriminatory pay"' 135 could not now be considered actionable. The Fourth
Circuit upheld the district court's complete rejection of plaintiffs' multiple
regression statistics, in part because they were based on data which included
"pre-Act hires, both pre-1965 and pre-1972."' 36
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's rejection of plaintiffs'
multiple regression analysis because of supposed missing factors in the
analysis. The plaintiffs' expert "had not included a number of variable factors
the court considered relevant."1 37  The Fourth Circuit stated that
"appropriate regression analysis of salary should .. . include all measurable
variables thought to have an effect on salary level."' 38
Fourth Circuit Judge Phillips wrote a strong dissent in which he opined
that if salary differentials based on race extended into the applicable period of
Title VII they were actionable.' 3 9 Furthermore, he was highly critical of the
court's rejection of the multiple regression statistics for supposed missing
factors hypothesized by the defendants. He stated that:
[T]o apply such a rule generally would effectively destroy the ability to establish any
Title VII pattern or practice claim by this means of proof..., will always be possible
for Title VII defendants to hypothesize yet another variable that might theoretically
reduce a race-effect coefficient demonstrated by any multiple regression analysis that
could be conceived.
14 0
130. Id. at 3008 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous Court).
131. Id. at 3008 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous Court).
132. Id. at 3005 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous Court).
133. Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 670 (4th Cir. 1984).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 671.
136. Id. at 672 n.7.
137. Id. at 672.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 695-96 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 692-93.
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Judge Phillips also contended that to rebut the inference of discrimination
raised by the regression analysis, the defendant should have presented
"evidence that the inclusion of other relevant variables would in fact reduce the
race-effect coefficient to a statistically insignificant level." 14 t In this case,
where the defendant's expert introduced one of the claimed missing factors
into his own regression analysis, it in fact increased the demonstrated race-
effect. 14
2
The Supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, unanimously reversed the
Fourth Circuit's holding on wage discrimination, with reasoning parallel to
Judge Phillips' dissent. 14 3 Justice Brennan's concurrence in part for a
unanimous Court was a strongly worded criticism of the Fourth Circuit's
decision. In response to the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the law did not
require the elimination of the effect of pre-Act discrimination on salary rates,
Justice Brennan stated:
The error of the court of Appeals with respect to salary disparities created prior to
1972 and perpetuated thereafter is too obvious to warrant extended discussion: that
the Extention Service discriminated with respect to salaries prior to the time it was
covered by Title VII does not excuse perpetuating that discrimination after the
Extension Service became covered by Title VII. To hold otherwise would have the
effect of exempting from liability those employers who were historically the greatest
offenders of the rights of blacks .... While recovery may not be permitted for pre-
1972 acts of discrimination, to the extent that this discrimination was perpetuated
after 1972, liability may be imposed.
Each week's pay check that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white
is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun
prior to the effective date of Title VII.1 4
This conclusion of the Supreme Court precisely corresponds with the
Mark and Mary example of continuing wage discrimination, set out in Section
III B of this article, and discussed at length in Section IV B. Clearly, under
the Bazemore decision, Title VII plaintiffs will now have strong precedent for
insisting that data on persons hired prior to the reach of the statute not be
removed from the multiple regression data set. And wage differences based
in part on pre-Act patterns of discrimination must not be permitted to persist
in the actionable period.
In Bazemore, the Supreme Court also strongly criticized the Fourth Circuit's
rejection of plaintiff's multiple regression statistics because of supposed
missing factors. Justice Brennan stated:
The Court of Appeals erred in stating that petitioners' regression analyses were
"unacceptable as evidence of discrimination," because they did not include "all
measurable variables thought to have an effect on salary level." The court's view of
the evidentiary value of the regression analyses was plainly incorrect. While the
omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analyses less probative
than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an
analysis which accounts for the major factors "must be considered unacceptable as
141. Id. at 693.
142. Id. at 693 n.7.
143. 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3009 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous
Court).
144. Id. at 3006 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous court) (emphasis in original).
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evidence of discrimination." Normally, failure to include variables will affect the
analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility.
Importantly, it is clear that a regression analysis that includes less than "all
measurable variables" may serve to prove a plaintiff's case. A plaintiff in a Title VII
suit need not prove discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is
to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 14 5
The Supreme Court has established that a logically prepared multiple
regression analysis which indicates discrimination exists cannot be defeated
by the mere claim of missing factors. The defendant must actually present
statistics which prove that a suggested missing factor will, when included in
the regression, eliminate the apparent discriminatory effect. t 46 Where the
defendant does establish that such a factor reduces the discriminary effect, the
plaintiff should still evalute the possible bias of that factor under the
combined disparate treatment/impact standard set out in this article.' 47
The Supreme Court's clear respect for the evidentiary value of multiple
regression analysis, as indicated in Bazemore, will undoubtedly lead to
increased reliance on this statistical technique in the future. Title VII
attorneys should take advantage of this powerful evidentiary tool.
145. Id. at 3009 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous court) (citations omitted).
146. See id. at 3010-11 & n.14 (Brennan, J., concurring in part for a unanimous court).
147. See supra Section IV A.
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